Why the History is Repeating Itself: From Chinese Philosophy to Multiculturalism

Traditionally, before the 17th century, the Chinese used the term Yidi (夷狄) to refer to foreigners. In this context, "foreigner" is defined not by race or ethnicity but by culture. Therefore, anyone not living under the Chinese cultural system was considered Yidi. Historically, China was ruled by Mongolians (during the Yuan Dynasty 元朝/ A.D. 1271-1368) and Manchus (during the Qing Dynasty 清朝/ A.D. 1636-1912). Despite their different ethnicities, both groups adopted Chinese traditions and governed according to the Chinese cultural system. Hence, even though the Mongolians and Manchus were ethnically distinct from the Han majority, the Yuan and Qing Dynasties are still recognized as legitimate Chinese dynasties rather than foreign regimes.

Regarding the term "Yidi," which refers to foreigners, an approximate English translation might be "barbarian." If you're a Westerner reading this, you might find the ancient Chinese perspective uncomfortably familiar, as "barbarian" is historically how Westerners referred to other peoples.

Returning to my initial statement about the pre-17th century period, Chinese contact with Europeans began during the 16th and 17th centuries. Although China lost some battles to the Europeans, they initially regarded them as just another type of Yidi, similar to the Central Asian foreigners they had previously encountered. However, the realization that Europeans possessed a similarly advanced civilization caused alarm among the Chinese. The last time the Chinese experienced such a fear was about two thousand years earlier, during the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period (春秋战国时期), or the pre-Qin era.

*Qin refers to the Qin Dynasty (秦B.C. 221-207), the first centralized feudal autocratic dynasty in Chinese history. Qin was also the name of the vassal state that eventually defeated all others during the Warring States Period. Hence, the era before the Qin Dynasty is referred to as Pre-Qin.

Pre-Qin Chinese Philosophies Before unification, China consisted of several smaller vassal states engaged in constant conflict, striving to unify China. This turbulent, divided society was fertile ground for diverse philosophical thoughts. Confucianism (儒家), Daoism (道家), Mohism (墨家), the School of Logicians (名家), and the Yin-Yang School (阴阳家)—all foundational Chinese philosophical perspectives—emerged during this tumultuous period. These philosophies, representing competing civilizations, mirrored the competition between Chinese and European cultures in the 16th and 17th centuries. Moreover, these philosophies bore a striking resemblance to major Western philosophical thoughts: Aristotelian, Utilitarian, Kantian, Contractarian, etc. Here are some examples of these similarities:


(1) Xuncius and Thomas 

Hobbs Xuncius (荀), a prominent Confucian, differed from Confucius and Mencius in his belief that people were naturally self-interested or even wicked, but capable of developing morality. Hence, he viewed morality as a product of conscious effort. His argument for the origin of morality was as follows:

【荀子曰：“礼起于何也？曰：人生而有欲，欲而不得，则不能无求，求而无度量分界，则不能不争。争则乱，乱则穷。先王恶其乱也，故制礼义以分之，以养人之欲，给人之求，使欲必不穷乎物，物必不屈于欲，两者相持而长，是礼之所起也。”】

(1) People need to coexist for survival and safety; 

(2) Effective coexistence requires social organization; 

(3) Social organization necessitates conduct rules; Thus, people need conduct rules to establish a successful cooperative society.

In Chinese, "rules of conduct" are referred to as "礼," a term often translated as "politeness" or "etiquette" but holds a broader meaning in Xuncius's usage. Xuncius’s theory likely reminds one of Thomas Hobbs, a Contractarian (1588-1679), who also viewed people as self-interested and morality as a rational strategy for self-interest maximization. Contractarianism posits that social contracts or agreements among members are the basis of moral authority, similar to Xuncius's deviation from Confucius and Mencius regarding the inherent goodness of human nature.

(2) Mo Zi and John Stuart Mill

Mo Zi (墨子) is the representative of Mohism. He argued that the purpose of all human behavior was to maximize utility and to avoid harm （取利避害）. Mo Zi once said, “What is justice? Utility (义，利也).” When asked to define utility, Mo Zi reply, “what people like”. When asked to define harm, Mo Zi replied, “what people dislike (from《经上》).” This implies the hedonistic principle in Mo Zi’s utilitarianism.

【墨子曰：“断指以存腕，利之中取大，害之中取小也。害之中取小，非害也，取利也。……遇盗人而断指以免身。免身，利也。其遇盗人，害也。……利之中取大，非不得已也。害之中取小，不得已也。于所未有而取焉，是利之中取大也。于所既有而弃焉，是害之中取小也。”所以人类一切行为的规则是：“利之中取大；害之中取小 (from《大取》)。”】

Aligned with the principle of maximizing utility and avoiding harm, Mo Zi advocated for impartial love (兼爱), which involves loving everyone equally. This aligns with utilitarianism's egalitarian principle. Western proponents of impartial love, like Peter Singer in his works "Famine, Affluence, and Morality" and "Animal Liberation," argue for extending love beyond immediate circles to distant people and animals capable of suffering.

Politically, Mo Zi argued for a form of totalitarianism, emphasizing that political authority should serve to end chaos and establish order. He believed that without a clearly defined order, society would revert to a chaotic “state of nature.” The rise of Mohism, with its focus on regulation and obedience, mirrored the chaotic state of pre-Qin Dynasty China, where people longed for a centralized state.

Criticism emerged against Mohism, notably “Infinity kills egalitarian love (无穷害兼)” and “Killing a thief is still killing a person (杀盗，杀人也).” These critiques are reminiscent of arguments against utilitarianism in Western philosophy. Yet, Mo Zi’s responses to these criticisms were, in my opinion, more eloquent than many contemporary utilitarians. For those interested in Mo Zi's rebuttals, his works are highly recommended.

(3) Legalists, Max Weber, and Trump

Legalism (法家), another Chinese philosophical perspective, emerged later and came to prominence at the end of the Warring States Period. The central tenet of legalism was the establishment of a political authority based on clearly defined rules rather than moral norms. Like Xuncius, legalists viewed human nature as self-interested, but they did not believe this nature could or needed to be changed. Legalism's focus on laws and punishment was instrumental in helping the Qin state unite China. However, the harshness of legalism also led to the quick downfall of the Qin Dynasty, which lasted only 15 years (B.C. 221- B.C 207).

Legalism's emphasis on rules and structure brings to mind Max Weber's observations on bureaucracy, which he described as a system so impersonal that it could function under any ruler. This concept resonates with the current U.S. political climate, where figures like Trump have risen to power with policies that are quick, concise, and easily understood, echoing legalism's efficiency. However, the brief reign of the Qin Dynasty serves as a historical lesson about the potential pitfalls of such governance.

(4) Other Similarities 

Zhuang Zi (庄子), another key figure in Daoism alongside Lao Zi, proposed a theory of happiness akin to Aristotle’s Virtue Ethics, suggesting that happiness stems from the free development of natural talents.

The school of Logicians in ancient China, similar to the sophists in Plato’s writings, held high status. They distinguished between the concrete (实) and names (名), positing that while the former is relative and changeable, the latter remains absolute and stable. For those interested in exploring these ideas further, "Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance" offers a contemporary Western perspective resonating with these ancient Chinese concepts.

(5) From Then to Now

In this section, I have described Chinese philosophy from B.C. 770-221, covering the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period. Feng Youlan, a renowned scholar in Chinese philosophy, once observed, "Contemporary world history, particularly over the past few centuries, seems to echo the Chinese history of the Spring and Autumn Period and the Warring States Period." This observation becomes evident when we consider the 16th-century interactions between China and Europe. During this period, China, much like it had been when it was divided into seven vassal states with competing philosophical ideologies, faced the unsettling realization of encountering another advanced civilization.

The United States, in more recent history, has undergone a comparable journey. Post-World War II, America emerged economically dominant, overshadowing other nations. Despite the Great Depression from 1929 to 1933, post-war America amassed wealth in various forms: real capital, industrial prowess, intellectual and technical resources, and a bolstered sense of self-assurance (Lemert 2013:212). The period from 1945 to 1963 marked a golden era, fostering a sense of national pride.

However, the ensuing Cold War between the U.S. and the USSR signified more than just ideological strife between communism and democracy. According to Charles Lemert, it reflected a deeper issue within modernity itself – an unwillingness to self-reflect, with each system blaming the other for perceived evils. By the 1960s, America's central position in global affairs began to erode. Its moral standing was questioned due to its involvement in Southeast Asian conflicts and internal racial tensions. Economically, it shifted from a creditor to a debtor nation, particularly after the OPEC oil crisis.

As the 20th century progressed, scholars posited the advent of postmodernism, characterized by fragmentation, self-dissolution, and skepticism towards absolute knowledge (Giddens). Lemert suggests that multiculturalism is a manifestation of this postmodern ethos. The influx of immigrant workers in Western nations like the U.S. and Europe, brought in to mitigate local wage demands, altered the cultural landscape. These workers, unwilling to confine themselves to low-wage roles, inadvertently stirred feelings of threat among the traditionally dominant white, European-descended populations. Lemert notes that the rise of a multi-cultural world, differing starkly from the long-standing modern ideals of Western societies, introduced new tensions and dynamics.

Therefore, within the last eight decades, the U.S. has transitioned from being the world's epicenter to a state of decentering, now feeling the pressure of emerging cultural players. Today's world, while novel in many respects, also bears striking resemblance to historical patterns. The ever-present challenge to dominant cultural ideals by a diverse, multi-cultural world continues to shape our global narrative.