Thoughts about Den Dennett's article- Where Am I?

"Where Am I?" is a philosophical story by Dennett. To undertake a secret mission deep within the earth, Dennett had his brain (Yorick) removed from his body (Hamlet) due to extreme radiation. Yorick was placed in a vat and connected to Hamlet through wireless electronics. During the mission, Hamlet ceased to function due to accidents. Dennett’s perspective then shifted from deep within the earth to the location of his brain. Upon awakening, Dennett found himself in a completely different body (Fortinbras), yet his personality remained intact, while Hamlet was abandoned deep within the earth. After adjusting to Fortinbras, Dennett discovered a computerized brain duplicate (Hubert) functioning in perfect sync with Yorick. Scientists installed a switch to alternate control between Yorick and Hubert. Dennett noticed no change in his feelings and perceptions when flipping the switch. However, during the story, when the switch was flipped, a new voice exclaimed, "THANK GOD! I THOUGHT YOU'D NEVER FLIP THAT SWITCH!” This indicated that Hubert and Yorick had fallen out of sync, with Hubert now controlling Fortinbras. The question arises: Who is the real Dennett?

Dennett might be identified with his original body, Hamlet, which served as the source of his sensory experiences and actions. However, in the case of a brain transplant, he would prefer to be the donor, suggesting that personal identity is likely tied to the brain, the source of thoughts and consciousness. If forced to choose, Dennett would likely imprison his brain, leaving the body free, suggesting a preference for the brain as the locus of his identity. Yet, can we say that Dennett's location is the jail when his brain is there, disregarding the body that provides sensory access to the world?

Alternatively, Dennett’s identity might be determined not by any physical part but by the content of his first-person point of view. This perspective could shift from the sensory point of view of the body to a non-sensory one. For instance, when sensory deprivation occurred deep inside the earth, his sense of self returned at the speed of light to the location of his brain, with his perception following shortly after. This notion seems to support dualism, the belief that minds are not spatial or subject to physical laws. However, this analysis may not be sufficient as it doesn't fully address the complexity of identity.

Rejecting these notions, I propose a materialistic viewpoint: Dennett's identity doesn't require immaterial or metaphysical considerations. Dualism argues for a distinction between mind and body, but as a materialist, I question how mental processes can cause physical movements. For example, if Dennett loses an arm, is he present both where his arm and the rest of his body are? The brain, although critical for consciousness and memory, is still a part of the physical body. Thus, Dennett's identity could be seen as a combination of Yorick and Hamlet, the brain and the original body.

The scenario becomes more complex when Dennett awakens in Fortinbras's body. Is Dennett now a combination of Yorick and Fortinbras? John Locke argued that personal identity is tied not to the human body but to continuous memory, making the brain crucial. Thus, the combination of Yorick and Fortinbras could be seen as Dennett, similar to Yorick and Hamlet.

When Dennett adapted to Fortinbras, he found Hubert, a computerized duplicate of Yorick. Despite their functional equivalence, it's debatable whether Hubert understands experiences as Yorick does. When the switch was flipped to Hubert, it raised the question of whether Hubert's control constituted a separate identity.

In conclusion, I argue that Dennett equals the combination of Yorick and either Hamlet or Fortinbras. However, the implications of this conclusion raise profound questions about identity in a world where technology allows for such bodily separation. It suggests a future where physical bodies are replaceable, yet personal identities remain constant. But if scientists can manipulate thoughts in such disembodied brains, it might lead to a loss of self-identity, echoing Descartes's contemplation of a perfect being creating imperfect creatures.

REFERENCES

Barnard, D. Who do you think you are? Retrieved from http://www.anselm.edu/homepage/dbanach/who.htm

Dennett, D. (1978). Where am I? Brainstorms: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology.

Friedrich, N. (1996). Dennett and personal identity. Retrieved from http://www.sfu.ca/~nicolea/papers/Dennett_and_Personal_Identity.htm

Locke, J. (1690). The prince and the cobbler. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.